Saturday, November 8, 2025

Revolution Chapter Two

 



Chapter 2 – The Architects of Change

The inner circle that would eventually engineer the September Intervention took shape quietly and methodically during the first half of 2026. What had begun as a loose collection of academics and civic leaders slowly hardened into a disciplined network of planners and analysts. Its members did not see themselves as conspirators but as custodians of a collapsing republic, forced to do what those in office could not or would not attempt.

At the centre of this network stood Dr Harvey Jacobs, already well known from his lectures, essays, and television commentaries. His mixed heritage and lifelong commitment to social justice lent him credibility across communities; his students described him as a man who could speak the language of Soweto and Stellenbosch in the same breath. He had spent years warning that South Africa’s democracy was eroding from within—that corruption, policy incoherence and patronage had replaced accountability. In his view the coming breakdown was not ideological but structural: a state so weakened that it could no longer maintain order or deliver services.

Jacobs’s public essays had attracted the attention of several prominent figures in business and civil society. Among the first to seek him out was Andries Marais, a mining executive who had seen his company reduced to a shadow by electricity shortages and export bottlenecks. Marais argued that without decisive action the entire private sector would soon follow. Others joined—retired judge Naledi Motaung, former defence strategist Colonel Sipho Nkadimeng, economist Professor Nigel Cooper-Smith, and the lawyer-activist Sakena Moloketsi, whose earlier work on constitutional reform had earned national respect.

They met discreetly in Johannesburg and later in Pretoria, under the guise of a “national dialogue forum.” Over months of discussion a consensus emerged that the political system was beyond internal repair. The ANC’s hold on the state was maintained through networks of dependency—employment in state enterprises, municipal contracts, and the promise of patronage. Any government that tried to govern honestly from within that framework would be destroyed by it. Only a decisive external intervention, they concluded, could break the cycle.

Their deliberations remained theoretical until March 2026, when several senior officers within the South African National Defence Force quietly approached Nkadimeng. The officers—career professionals marginalised by politically connected superiors—offered their cooperation should a plan for national stabilisation become necessary. Around the same time, executives of large private security firms indicated willingness to maintain order if the state faltered. These parallel contacts convinced the Forum that a coordinated intervention was not only possible but already half-prepared by circumstance.

The group adopted a provisional title: The Council for National Renewal. Its early meetings focused on defining legitimacy. Jacobs insisted that any future action must present itself not as a seizure of power but as a guardianship—temporary, procedural, and justified solely by the need to restore the rule of law. The Council’s minutes, later released, recorded his words: “If we are to act outside the constitution, it must be to save the constitution’s purpose, not to destroy it.”

Funding and logistical planning followed. Business donors, fearful of collapse yet unwilling to appear partisan, channelled resources through charitable foundations. Retired intelligence officers mapped communications nodes and transport corridors; sympathetic engineers provided information on national-grid control points. The Council’s analysts identified key ministries where immediate control would prevent administrative paralysis: finance, energy, defence, and broadcasting.

As plans advanced, international legitimacy became a priority. A small delegation—two businessmen, a former diplomat, and an academic adviser—travelled quietly to Washington, ostensibly to attend an investment conference. While there, they met with policy figures linked to the President. The delegation sought no overt endorsement, only an assurance that any South African transition aimed at restoring order and market confidence would not be condemned. They returned with cautious encouragement: the message was that the world would accept almost any government that could guarantee stability and protect trade.

Back in South Africa, Jacobs laboured to forge unity among the Council’s disparate members. Afriforum and business associations pushed for a swift, decisive coup centred on property rights and deregulation. Civil-rights organisations argued for a social compact rooted in justice and accountability. Jacobs positioned himself between these factions, arguing that the success of any post-coup administration would depend on moral legitimacy rather than force. “If the people do not believe we act for their good,” he warned, “they will turn on us before the year is out.”

Throughout the winter, the Council refined its blueprint. The plan called for simultaneous occupation of key communication centres, airports, and government complexes, coupled with a media announcement framing the operation as a constitutional rescue. ANC leadership would be confined, not harmed; Parliament suspended but intact. Essential services—electricity, policing, banking—would continue under emergency management.

Each member understood the risks. Failure would mean treason charges; success would still require confronting the enormous task of governing a broken state. Yet there was a growing sense of inevitability. Each week brought new evidence of governmental paralysis: unpaid public servants, collapsing hospitals, and the postponement of yet another municipal election.

By late August the decision was effectively made. The Council’s final meetings, held in a farmhouse outside Paarl, were sober affairs. Jacobs appeared withdrawn but resolute. He told his colleagues that moral courage consisted not in certainty but in action taken despite uncertainty. “History will judge us not by our hesitation but by what we build after the noise stops,” he said.

When the government confirmed its intention to delay the elections “for administrative reasons,” the Council set the date. The intervention would commence before dawn on the first Monday of September 2026.

The architects of change had completed their design. All that remained was to bring it to life.


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Revolution Chapter Two

  Chapter 2 – The Architects of Change The inner circle that would eventually engineer the September Intervention took shape quietly and m...